http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/JG30Cb01.html
Jul 30, 2008
CHINA'S
DOLLAR MILLSTONE, Part 1
Breaking
free from dollar
hegemony
By Henry C K Liu
The
vast expansion of US-led globalized trade since the Cold War ended in
1991 had been fueled by unsustainable serial debt bubbles built on
dollar hegemony, which came into existence on a global scale with the
emergence of deregulated global financial markets that made
cross-border flow of funds routine since the 1990s.
Dollar
hegemony is a geopolitically constructed peculiarity through which
critical commodities, the most notable being oil, are denominated in
fiat dollars, not backed by gold or other species since then
president Richard Nixon took the US dollar off gold in 1971. The
recycling of petro-dollars into other dollar assets is the price the
US has extracted from oil-producing countries for US tolerance of the
oil-exporting cartel since 1973. After
that, everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil, and every
economy needs oil. Dollar hegemony separates the trade value of every
currency from direct connection to the productivity of the issuing
economy to link it directly to the size of dollar reserves held by
the issuing central bank. Dollar hegemony enables the US to own
indirectly but essentially the entire global economy by requiring its
wealth to be denominated in fiat dollars that the US can print at
will with little in the way of monetary penalties.
World
trade is now a game in which the US produces fiat dollars of
uncertain exchange value and zero intrinsic value, and the rest of
the world produces goods and services that fiat dollars can buy at
"market prices" quoted in dollars. Such market prices are
no longer based on mark-ups over production costs set by
socio-economic conditions in the producing countries. They are kept
artificially low to compensate for the effect of overcapacity in the
global economy created by a combination of overinvestment and weak
demand due to low wages in every economy.
Such low market
prices in turn push further down already low wages to further cut
cost in an unending race to the bottom. The higher the production
volume above market demand, the lower the unit market price of a
product must go in order to increase sales volume to keep revenue
from falling. Lower market prices require lower production costs
which in turn push wages lower. Lower wages in turn further reduce
demand.
To prevent loss of revenue from falling prices,
producers must produce at still higher volume, thus further lowering
market prices and wages in a downward spiral. Export economies are
forced to compete for market share in the global market by lowering
both domestic wages and the exchange rate of their currencies. Lower
exchange rates push up the market price of commodities which must be
compensated for by even lower wages. The adverse effects of dollar
hegemony on wages apply not only to the emerging export economies but
also to the importing US economy. Workers all over the world are
oppressed victims of dollar hegemony, which turns the labor theory of
value up-side-down.
In a global market operating under dollar
hegemony, the world's interlinked economies no longer trade to
capture Ricardian comparative advantage. The theory of comparative
advantage as espoused by British economist David Ricardo (1772-1823)
asserts that trade can benefit all participating nations, even those
that command no absolute advantage, because such nations can still
benefit from specializing in producing products with the lowest
opportunity cost, which is measured by how much production of another
good needs to be reduced to increase production by one additional
unit of that good.
This theory reflected British national
opinion at the 19th century when free trade benefited Britain more
than its trade partners. However, in today's globalized trade when
factors of production such as capital, credit, technology,
management, information, branding, distribution and sales are mobile
across national borders and can generate profit much greater than
manufacturing, the theory of comparative advantage has a hard time
holding up against measurable data.
Under dollar hegemony,
exporting nations compete in the global market to capture needed
dollars to service dollar-denominated foreign capital and debt, to
pay for imported energy, raw material and capital goods, to pay
intellectual property fees and information technology fees. Moreover,
their central banks must accumulate dollar reserves to ward off
speculative attacks on the value of their currencies in world
currency markets. The higher the market pressure to devalue a
particular currency, the more dollar reserves its central bank must
hold. Only the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, is exempt from
this pressure to accumulate dollars because it can issue
theoretically unlimited additional dollars at will with monetary
immunity. The dollar is merely a Federal Reserve note, no more, no
less.
Dollar hegemony has created a built-in support for a
strong dollar that in turn forces the world's other central banks to
acquire and hold more dollar reserves, making the dollar stronger,
fueling a massive global debt bubble denominated in dollars as the US
becomes the world's largest debtor nation. Yet a strong dollar, while
viewed by US authorities as in the US national interest, in reality
drives the defacement of all fiat currencies that operate as
derivative currencies of the dollar, in turn driving the current
commodity-led inflation. When the dollar falls against the euro, it
does not mean the euro is rising in purchasing power. It only means
the dollar is losing purchasing power faster than the euro. A strong
dollar does not always mean high dollar exchange rates. It means only
that the dollars will stay firmly anchored as the prime reserve
currency for international trade even as it falls in exchange value
against other trading currencies.
In recent decades, central
banks of all governments, led by the US Federal Reserve during Alan
Greenspan's watch, had bought economic growth with loose money to
feed debt bubbles and to contain inflation with "structural
unemployment", which has been defined as up to 6% of the
workforce, to keep the labor market from being inflationary. Central
banking has mutated from being an institution to safeguard the value
of money so as to ensure wages from full employment do not lose
purchasing power into one with a
perverted mandate to promote and preserve dollar hegemony by
releasing debt bubbles denominated in fiat dollars.
(See Critique
of Central Banking, Asia Times Online, November 6, 2002.)
Despite all the talk about globalization as an irresistible
trend of progress, the priority for the United States in the final
analysis has been to advance its superpower economic objectives, not
its obligations as the center of the global monetary system. This
superpower economic objective includes the global expansion of US
economic dominance through dollar hegemony, reducing all domestic
economies, including that of the US, to be merely local units of a
global empire. Thus when the US asserts that a healthy and strong
economy in Europe, Japan and even Russia and China, all former
enemies, is part of the Pax Americana, it is essentially declaring a
neocolonial claim on these economies.
The concept of
"stakeholder" in the global geopolitical-economic order
advanced by Robert B Zoellick, former US deputy secretary of state
and now president of the World Bank, is a solicitation from the US to
emerging economic powerhouses to support this Pax Americana. The
device for accomplishing this neo-imperialism is a
coordinated monetary policy managed by a global system of central
banking, first
adopted in the US in 1913 to allow a financial elite to gain
monetary control of the US national economy,
and after the Cold War, to allow the US as the sole remaining
superpower controlled by a financial oligarchy to gain
monetary control of the entire global economy.
With the help of supranational institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund and the Bank of International
Settlements, the US aims to negate national economic sovereignty with
globalization of unregulated trade conducted under dollar hegemony.
Unregulated trade globalization in the 21st century aims to
neutralize national economic sovereignty to preempt national
development financed by sovereign credit. Trade through export has
become the sole operative path for national economic growth in a
political world order of sovereign nation states that has existed
since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.
No national domestic economy can henceforth prosper without first
adding to the prosperity of US-controlled global economy denominated
in dollars.
Holy
Dollar Empire
Echoing
the Holy Roman Empire, the global economy has been operating as
a global Holy Dollar Empire with the Federal Reserve as the Holy
Dollar Emperor.
Similar to the Holy Roman Empire, which disintegrated from the rise
of Lutheran nationalism, this Holy Dollar Empire will eventually
disintegrate from progressive centrifugal forces of a new populist
economic nationalism. This new nationalism is not to be confused with
regressive trade protectionism. The formation of the new Group of
Five (G5 - China, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa) in the 2008
Group of Eight Summit in Tokyo (G8 - the US, UK, Germany, France,
Italy, Japan, Russia and the European Union) is a sign of this new
trend of progressive economic nationalism. The 2008 US presidential
election may herald in a new populism in US history to reform the
structure of US
debt capitalism.
In his speech to the G5 leaders, China's President Hu Jintao
said: "It is necessary to take into full account the issue of
food security in tackling the challenges in energy, climate change
and other fields." Apart from calling for the setting up of an
UN-led international co-operation mechanism and a global
food-security safeguard system, Hu said all countries should
strengthen cooperation in grain reserves, a process of proven success
in China but not recommended by the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization, which views such scheme as a distortion of trade.
Liberation from this Holy Dollar Empire of dollar hegemony
can
only come from sovereign nations withdrawing from the global central
banking regime to return to a national banking regime within a world
order of sovereign nation states to
put monetary policy back in its proper role of supporting national
development goals, rather than sacrificing national development to
support global dollar hegemony through wage-suppressing export-led
growth.
In
a world order of sovereign nation states, the supranational nature of
central banking will render it inoperative, as it can be and has been
used as an
all-controlling device for the world's rich nation to neutralize the
sovereign rights of financially weak nations.
In a democratic world order, central banking is also inoperative
within national borders, as it can be used by a nation's rich as a
device to deny the working poor of their economic rights. Central
banking, in its support of dollar hegemony, operates internationally
in opposition to the economic interests of sovereign nation states
and domestically in opposition to the economic rights of the working
poor by discrediting enlightened economic nationalism as undesirable
protectionism.
To
preserve dollar hegemony, exporting economies that accumulate large
dollar reserves through trade surpluses are forced by the US to
revalue their currencies upward, not to redress the trade imbalance,
which is the result of dysfunctional
terms of trade rather
than inoperative exchange rates, but to reduce the value, in foreign
local currency terms, of US debt assumed at previously stronger
dollar exchange rates. When commodities prices rise, it reflects a
defacement of all fiat currencies led by the dollar as a benchmark.
When the currency of another nation rises against the dollar, it does
not mean that currency can buy more; it only means the dollar can buy
less than what the appreciating currency can buy. This is why
commodities prices have been rising in all currencies, albeit at
different rates.
The bursting of the latest
dollar-denominated debt bubble created a global credit crisis in
August 2007 that is beginning to cause globalized trade to contract.
Exporting economies around the world are now forced to reconsider
their dysfunctional strategy of seeking growth through exports for
fiat dollars that are pushing the world economy towards
hyperinflation, leading all other fiat currencies in a depreciation
race to the bottom.
China's
high trade dependency
At
the top of the list of exporting economies is China's. The country in
2006 registered an unwholesome trade-to-GDP (gross domestic product)
ratio of 69%, with a per capita trade value of US$1,645. In 2007,
China's nominal GDP was 24.66 trillion yuan, or $3.38 trillion at
then exchange rate of 7.3 yuan to a dollar. The 2007 per capita GDP
for the population of 1.32 billion was 18,655 yuan, or $2,556,
translating to $9,711 on purchasing power parity (PPP) ratio of 3.8.
If China's exports were to be redirected towards the domestic market,
the country's 2007 per capita GDP on a PPP basis would have increased
by $5,384 to $15,095, even not counting any stimulant multiplying
effect. Chinese
household consumption remains at a
record low of 37%
of GDP, the smallest ratio in all of Asia,
due to low Chinese wages.
China's trade surplus fell 20%
year-on-year in June 2008 to $21.3 billion because of a drop in
export growth. In Chinese currency terms the drop is more due to a
rise in its exchange rate against the dollar. Still, it was the
biggest surplus since December 2007, which totaled $22.7 billion.
Export value in June was $121.5 billion, 18.2% more than a year
earlier but the growth rate was nearly 10 percentage points down from
the May figure. Imports totaled $100.1 billion, up 23.7% from a year
earlier. China's trade surplus with the US in June totaled $14.7
billion, 5% higher than 2007. The surplus with the EU, its biggest
export market, was worth $13.2 billion, up 21.2% from 2007.
Chinese
exports are slowing because of reduced global growth caused by a
developing US recession, while imports are rising on the back of
rising commodity prices. These figures are not inflation adjusted.
However, they reflect the rising exchange value of the yuan. In other
words, exports have been falling more in yuan terms. The fall in
exports is expected to accelerate as no
market analyst of worth is projecting any quick or sharp recovery in
the US economy.
Going forward, the ratio of nominal-GDP to PPP-GDP can be
expected to fall as China's domestic inflation rate continues to
exceed the US inflation rate. This trend will gain momentum as China
attempts to use its trade surplus denominated in dollars for domestic
development, which requires it to issue more yuan into the Chinese
money supply. And market pressure can be expected to push the yuan
down against the dollar until the Chinese inflation rate is at parity
with the US inflation rate.
But a falling exchange rate
causes more domestic inflation from imports denominated in dollars;
and rising domestic inflation adds pressure to a falling exchange
rate in a downward spiral, preventing the yuan from rising against
the dollar from market forces. That is the dysfunctionality of the
yuan-dollar exchange rate regime in relation to the inflation rate
differentials between the two economies, when the exchange rate is
set by trade imbalance denominated in dollars. This dysfunctionality
is cause by the flawed attempt to use exchange rates to compensate
for dysfunctional terms of trade, which has been mostly caused by
wage disparity.
Stagflation
danger
Li Yining,
a leading Chinese economist, former president of Guanghua School of
Management at Beijing University and member of the Standing Committee
of the 11th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Conference, the country's political advisory body, opined in the
Second Meeting of the Standing Committee on July 4, 2008, that China
is facing a pressing challenge in preventing inflation from turning
into stagflation - the dual evils of high unemployment along with
high inflation - if market expectation concludes that Chinese
policymakers will fail to insulate the economy from the developing
global slowdown that is expected
to deepen next year with no prospect of a quick recovery.
Overwrought anti-inflation macroeconomic measures by Chinese
policymakers may cause investors to dump shares of companies in the
export sector, putting these companies in financial distress and
causing foreign capital to exit the Chinese economy to cause
unemployment to rise in China. As China is unhealthily trade
dependent, this will hurt domestic development and curb consumer
spending.
Li argues that China should decelerate the pace of
capital and foreign exchange decontrol within the context of an
oncoming, protracted global economic slowdown to preserve the value
of its huge foreign exchange reserves in yuan terms. He wants the
government to avoid being misguided by the static concept of a fixed
low inflation rate target of 3%. Rather, an
inflation rate up to 60% of the economic growth rate should be
permissible,
meaning to allow an inflation rate at around 6%
for a 10% growth rate.
China's inflation rate hit an 11-year high of 8.7% in
February 2008 and eased to 7.7% in May, still high above the
government-set goal of 3% annualized. Li points out that incoming
economic data show that the Chinese economy is on a sound footing
despite new challenges from abroad and at home, including the May 12
Sichuan earthquake and serious floods in the south. However, Li
warned the government to avoid risks of stagflation in formulating
macro policies going forward.
Li's advice is sensible. It
serves no useful purpose to cause a collapse of the economy to fight
inflation, as Paul Volcker did in the US in the1980s, making the cure
worse than the disease. Still, Volcker was facing a 20% inflation
rate in 1980, which might have justified drastic action. Yet Li
should realize that under dollar hegemony, Chinese central bankers
must try to keep the Chinese inflation rate target below 3% to stay
on par with the dollar inflation rate target set by the US Federal
Reserve, the head of the
world's central bank snake.
A 6% inflation rate in China would be more than triple the current
inflation rate target set by the US central bank, the defender of
dollar hegemony even as it allows the dollar's exchange rate to fall.
A Chinese inflation rate of 6%, as proposed by Li, would
cause market forces to push the yuan down against the dollar, further
exacerbating US-China trade tension and reviving protectionist
pressure in the US. As China is being pressured relentlessly by the
US to further revalue the yuan upward against the dollar, yuan
interest rates must rise above Chinese inflation rates. At 6%
interest rate for the yuan, the disparity with the dollar interest
rate would cause hot money denominated in dollars to rush into China
through "carry trade" to profit from interest rate
arbitrage, betting on continuing Chinese government intervention to
keep the yuan from falling against the dollar despite higher Chinese
inflation.
With a 6% inflation rate, China will be forced to
pay currency traders massive sums to defend an overvalued yuan
dictated by US trade policy in contradiction of US Treasury policy of
a strong dollar. That
was how the Bank of England allowed itself to be broken by George
Soros on Black Wednesday, September 16, 1992,
when the British central bank attempted in vain to defend an
overvalued pound sterling out
of sync with its interest rate regime.
It was also how the Hong Kong government was forced to execute its
"incursion"
into the equity market
in August 1998 to defend the Hong Kong dollar's peg to the US dollar
against market fundamentals.
China has been forced to take
steps to offset the impact of the US Fed's easy money policy on the
Chinese economy. The US Fed has cut the Fed funds rate target eight
times since September 18, 2007 from 5.75% to 2% on April 30, and the
discount rate nine times since August 17, 20007 from 6.25% to 2.25%
on April 30. Although China's central bank has issued notes to absorb
excess liquidity, market pressure still exists for the central bank
to put more currency into circulation to add to already excessive
liquidity. China's central bank has increased interest rates six
times and the bank reserve ratio 15 times since 2007, but Shanghai
interbank rates have increased only slightly, signaling major
resistance to monetary policy.
LIBOR
and SHIBOR
Assistant
governor Yi Gang of the People's Bank of China (PBoC), the central
bank, in a speech in the 2008Y SHIBOR
(Shanghai inter-bank borrowing rate) Work
Conference on January 11, 2008, outlined the role of SHIBOR,
introduced a year ago as a benchmark rate for money market
participants. At the initial stage of the index's launching, central
bank promotion is deemed necessary. But the SHIBOR, as a market
benchmark, will be set by the market and all market participants. Yi
asserts that all parties concerned including financial institutions
the National Inter-bank Funding Center and National Association of
Financial Market Institutional Investors should have a full
understanding of this, and actively play a role in the operations of
SHIBOR as "stakeholders", the new buzzword in Chinese
policy circle, thanks to Robert Zoellick.
Yi said that "under
the command economy, the central bank is the leader while commercial
banks are followers. But from the current [market economy]
perspective of the central bank's functions, the bipartite
relationship varies on different occasions. In terms of monetary
policies, the central bank, as the monetary authority, is the policy
maker and regulator, while commercial banks are market participants
and players. But in terms of market building, the relationship is not
simply that of leader and followers, but of central bank and
commercial banks in a market environment. This broad positioning and
premise will have a direct bearing on how we behave. On the one hand,
it requires the central bank to work as a service provider, a general
designer and supervisor of the market. On the other hand, it requires
market participants and various associations to cultivate SHIBOR as
stakeholders and players on a leveling playground."
The
fact of the matter is that in the US, the central bank, in addition
to being a lender of last resort, has become a key market participant
in the
repo market (in which, effectively, stock is borrowed or lent for
cash, with the stock serving as collateral)
to keep short-term interest rates aligned with the Fed funds rate
target set by the Fed Open Market Committee. Until proposed reforms
are adopted by Congress, the Fed is not the regulator of non-bank
financial institutions, be they investment banks and brokerage
houses, hedge funds, private equity firms, or the recently active
foreign funds.
The role of regulating the issuing of
securities in the US belongs to the Security Exchange Commission
(SEC), created by the Securities Act of 1933 to protect investors by
maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets while facilitating
capital formation. Securities offered to the general public must be
registered with the SEC, requiring extensive public disclosure,
including issuing a prospectus on the offering. It is a
time-consuming and expensive process.
Most commercial
paper, the market
that precipitated the credit crisis in August 2007, is
issued under Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act,
which exempts
from registration requirements short-term securities with certain
characteristics.
The exemption requirements have been a factor shaping the
characteristics of the commercial paper market. Private
equity firms with fewer than 15 investors and hedge funds, even
though they may control billions of equity and multi billions of
credit, are not regulated by the SEC.
When
the Federal Reserve and other central banks have taken crisis-induced
actions since August 2007 to calm markets to get market participants
to believe that the financial system will continue to operating
normally, market indicators, such as London InterBank Offered Rate
(LIBOR), on which SHIBOR is modeled, suggest that the Fed's message
has not been accepted by market participants. The LIBOR, a global
benchmark, normally trades predictably at only a few basis points
(hundreds of a percentage point) above the federal funds rate. It is
a "traded version of the fed funds rate". As such, it's an
important benchmark for determining lending rates on big corporate
deals, mortgages and other lending markets.
LIBOR has been
out of normal alignment with the Fed funds rate since the credit
crisis began in August 2007. The Fed and the European Central Bank
have already been greasing the markets by adding liquidity through
reserve operations. When the credit crisis broke, one-month LIBOR was
traded at an abnormally high 5.82% when the Fed funds rate target was
5.25%, a 57 basis points spread, and the Fed discount rate was cut 50
basis points to 5.75%. The Fed has since cut the fed funds rate
target from 5.25% to its current 2% and the discount rate from 6.24%
to 2.25%, but the spread between the Fed funds rate and LIBOR has not
narrowed.
Three-month dollar LIBOR was trading at 2.75% as of
July 11, 2008, 75 basis points above the Fed funds rate. It means
banks are not willing to lend short-term money to each other for fear
of counterparty default. Also, as part of general tightening in the
current credit crisis, banks have been hoarding cash to respond to
the frozen asset-backed commercial paper market. Many European banks
have committed to credit lines to big issuers of this paper, and
because nobody wants to take on more of that paper, those
paper-issuing companies are forced to borrow from banks using their
bank credit lines - making banks need more cash to build up required
reserves. With more than $1 trillion of commercial paper set to come
due every six weeks since August 2007 and more than $700 billion as
of June 2008, banks are reluctant to tie up their reserves lending to
other banks even at rates that would normally seem extremely
attractive.
At present, lending and deposit interest rates
are regulated
in China with a floor lending rate and a ceiling deposit rate.
Central banker Yi said that "[W]hen clients complain about high
interest rate, commercial banks can pass the buck to the central bank
because the central bank sets the interest floor. When SHIBOR
matures, SHIBOR will become the culprit. Such a change bears
important legitimacy, authoritativeness, and persuasiveness, and can
make SHIBOR a recognized and authoritative benchmark."
Yi
sees market-based interest rates coming from deregulation. But if the
central bank deregulates deposit rate ceiling and lending rate floor
when there is no other reliable benchmark to substitute them, the
result could be worse. When is the right timing for deregulation? The
answer is when a new benchmark matures. SHIBOR is an important
benchmark in the process of making interest rates more market-based.
An interest rate floor and ceiling are likely to exist for some
period. Can the market-based interest rate transformation process
start with discount rate linking with SHIBOR? In fact, discount
facilities are loans. A breakthrough with the discount rate will have
a far-reaching impact on market-based interest rate transformation,
and provide experience for future interest rate reform, according to
Yi.
Yi touched on the relationship between SHIBOR and
internationalization of the yuan. In the past, the central bank
looked only at the domestic market, but now it must adopt a global
perspective. Many currencies in the world have their benchmark
interest rates, including LIBOR, EURIBOR, Japan's TIBOR and so forth.
The launch of SHIBOR shored up transaction volume in the Chinese
money market. Comparatively speaking, Shanghai's money market
capacity now is much smaller than that of London and New York. But
the yuan will soon become an important currency in the world, so
China will steadily push ahead with yuan convertibility under the
capital account.
At present, great appreciation pressure on
the yuan driven by large amounts of capital influx is to a large
extent due to a positive speculative outlook of China's economy and
purchase of yuan-denominated assets by foreign companies and
individuals. The money market is part of the financial infrastructure
that will establish the role of the yuan in world markets, according
to Yi.
Many existing financial products are linked to
interest rates set by the PBoC. So when the PBoC adjusts interest
rates, multiple factors have to be taken into account so as to
balance the interests of various parties. Any move to balance
interests involves different interest groups and complex situations.
So a widely accepted and objective benchmark is needed, and SHIBOR
can serve that need. More products, from company provident funds,
public welfare funds, company trust funds to wealth management
products, housing provident funds and broker depository funds can be
linked to SHIBOR.
Chinese equity markets have been taking a
beating in recent months. The
Shanghai Composite Index
fell from a peak of 6,124 in mid-October 2007 to 2,566 in early July
2008, a
fall of 58%,
largely due to the rising exchange value of the yuan and market
pressure on yuan interest rates to rise to keep lenders from cutting
off loans at negative interest rates. If the yuan becomes freely
convertible and tradable, China would be receiving 3% interest on its
sizable dollar reserves currently at $1.8 trillion while paying 6%
interest on much larger yuan deposits.
By seeking growth
through exports for dollars, China has trapped itself in an
incurable mismatch
between necessary domestic macroeconomic policies to assure
sustainable growth and its central bank's monetary policy dictated by
dollar hegemony. This mismatch is counterproductive, crisis-prone and
unsustainable.
And as China liberalizes its interest rate
regime and currency convertibility as advised by neo-liberal
economists whose credibility has been bankrupted by unfolding events,
the Chinese economy will face another financial crisis that will wipe
out a good part of the export-led financial and economic gains in the
last decade. All
exporting economies that have abandoned capital controls
since the emergence of deregulated globalization of financial markets
have
been regularly devastated
by
recurring financial crises
that have imploded every decade, the last three being the 1987 market
crash, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2007 credit crisis.
This latest crisis has yet to fully play out its destructiveness and
there are no signs so far that US policymakers trapped in
dysfunctional supply-side ideology have the economic wisdom and the
political dexterity to prevent it from turning into a
global depression.
China was relatively spared in the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis largely due to its then cautious pace of opening up its
financial sector to global market forces reacting to dollar hegemony.
This time around, China can only insulate itself from this pattern of
global financial crises by making a concerted effort to shift its
exports to the domestic market and to reduce substantially its trade
dependency from the current near 70% to below 30% in a planned manner
and on an orderly schedule. Exports should be returned by policy to
an augmentation role in the economy, supporting domestic development,
which should be the main focus of economic growth. The domestic
sector should no longer be made to sacrifice to support the export
sector. Exports should support domestic development, not act as a
parasite on domestic development.
Breaking
free from dollar hegemony
A
first step in this redirection of policy focus on domestic
development is for China to free itself from dollar hegemony. This
can be done by legally requiring
payment of all Chinese exports to be denominated in yuan
to stop the unproductive role of exporting for dollars that cannot be
spent domestically without incurring heavy monetary penalty. Such a
policy affects only Chinese exporters and can be implemented
unilaterally by Chinese law as a sovereign nation, without any need
for international coordination or foreign or supranational approval.
Importers of Chinese goods around the world will then have to
acquire yuan from the Chinese State Administration for Foreign
Exchange (SAFE) to pay for imports from China. The yuan exchange rate
and Chinese export prices can then be coordinated according to
Chinese domestic conditions. Import prices denominated in yuan can
then be more rationally linked to Chinese export prices. Foreign
trade for China then will benefit the yuan economy rather than the
dollar economy. There will be no need for the PBoC to hold dollar
reserves.
China's economic growth since 1980 has been driven
by export of low-price manufactured goods with a dysfunctionally low
wage scale. To correct the imbalance of trade that has been giving
China trade surpluses of dubious financial or economic benefit, China
needs to raise wages, not to revalue its currency. Raising Chinese
wages to the level of other advanced economies will redress the
current inoperative terms of international trade that now benefits
only the dollar economy to benefit the Chinese yuan economy.
This
low-wage-driven growth has distorted the progressive purpose of
Chinese socialist society by reintroducing many of the pre-revolution
socio-economic defects
commonly found under market capitalism,
such as
income and wealth disparity,
market-induced chronic unemployment,
inequality of opportunities,
collapsed social safety nets resulting from privatization of the part of the economy best handled by the public sector,
rampant corruption from a collapse of societal morals and excessive influence of money in the political process,
uneven regional development and
environmental
deterioration of crisis proportions.
The current export-led growth of China can be expected to be
seriously hampered by a protracted slowdown in the importing
economies. Despite China's image as an export juggernaut, the
country's per capita merchandise export in 2006 was $1,655, some
$135 lower than global per capita merchandise export of $1,780. This
is because Chinese wages are substantially lower than the average of
all export economies, while the prices of raw material are the same
for all buyers in the global market.
A fall in world demand
for exports would hit China harder than other export economies by
pushing already too low Chinese wages further down just to keep
Chinese export factories running. Also, since China's trade
dependency has increased steadily over time, importing inflation
through the export sector to the domestic sector, China's economy
would be hit proportionally harder by a downturn in exports than it
was during previous global recessions, unless current policy to
reduce trade dependency is accelerated.
Exports are measured
by gross revenue while GDP is measured in value-added terms. The
rules of input-output macroeconomics requires import inputs to be
subtracted from exports in value-added terms, and then conversion of
the remaining domestic content into value-added terms by subtracting
inputs from other domestic sectors to avoid making the denominator
for the export ratio much bigger than GDP. Normally, this would
reduce the export-to-GDP ratio. But China's domestic input is
excessively low due to low wages and rents, tax subsidies and weak
environmental regulations. Thus such input adjustments have little
impact on the trade-to-GDP ratio.
In recent years, China has
been shifting from exports with a high domestic content, such as
toys, to new export sectors that use more imported components, such
as steel and electronics, which accounted for 42% of total
manufactured exports in 2006, up from 18% in 1995. Domestic content
of electronics is only a third to a half that of traditional
light-manufacturing sectors. So in value-added terms, exports have
increased less than gross export revenues. This is not a comforting
development because it turns the export sector into a re-export
sector, benefiting the domestic economy even less.
China's
current-account surplus amounted to 11% of GDP in 2007. This means
its entire GDP growth was from the export sector, and its economy
produced far more than it consumed domestically. This surplus
production was shipped overseas for fiat dollars that cannot be
spent in the yuan economy while Chinese
workers could not afford the very products they produced
at low wages. Thus under hegemony, while China has become the
world's biggest creditor nation, it suffers from shortage of capital
needed by its still undeveloped economy, particularly in the vast
interior, and has to depend on foreign capital even in the coastal
regions when the export section is located. In recent years, Chinese
policy has encouraged higher domestic consumption, yet since 2005,
net exports have contributed more than 20% of GDP growth.
Some
analysts have suggested that China's GDP growth would stay at 9%
from strong domestic demand. Yet this demand comes mostly from
severe income disparity. China's exports to other emerging economies
are now bigger than those to the US or the EU. Asia and the Middle
East accounted for more than 40% of China's export growth in 2007,
North America for less than 10%. But Chinese trade with other
emerging economies was at a deficit, with China importing more, such
as oil and other commodities, than the oil-exporting small economies
could absorb in the way of low-price Chinese goods for their small
populations, while poor emerging economies cannot buy more from
China because they do not have sufficient dollars. If Chinese
exports are denominated in yuan, trade with these poor economies
would explode with balance because their exports to China can also
be denominated in yuan to pay for imports from China denominated in
yuan.
Export
for dollars
presents for all exporting countries a problem of diminishing
returns because of dollar hegemony. For China, it is a problem of
crisis proportions. Since global trade is denominated in dollars,
China's economy faces a capital shortage despite its new role as the
world's biggest creditor nation. China is forced to accept foreign
direct investment, which accounts for over 40% of GDP, despite the
country's chronic trade surplus and huge foreign exchange reserves
of upwards of $1.8 trillion and growing. Weaker export growth could
lead to a sharp drop in foreign direct investment because exporters
would need to add less capacity.
While over half of all
foreign
direct investment in China
is in infrastructure and property, such investment is
still mostly related to exports,
facilitating expatriate managers' housing, foreign company offices
in commercial buildings, power plants to supply export factories and
highways linking production areas with shipping terminals. Only
sovereign credit can redress China's problem of uneven regional
development caused by excessive dependence on foreign investment.
Next: Developing China's economy
with sovereign credit
Henry C K Liu is
chairman of a New York-based private investment group. His website is
at http://www.henryckliu.com.
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